

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CARACA 04012 01 OF 03 291601Z

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 NSCE-00 SP-02 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 ACDA-12 L-03
AF-10 EUR-12 IO-13 /097 W
-----115177 291646Z /45

O 291515Z APR 78

FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2124

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 CARACAS 4012

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: MARR, VE

SUBJ: DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT PEREZ ABOUT REGIONAL
RESTRAINT IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

REF: CARACAS 4013

SUMMARY: EINAUDI, CLAPP, AND I MET APRIL 28 WITH PRESIDENT PEREZ TO FOLLOW UP ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER ABOUT CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT IN LATIN AMERICA. WE PRESENTED THE INTERAGENCY-DEVELOPED FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL RESTRAINT, TYING THIS TO THE LARGER US EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE MULTILATERAL RESTRAINT. PRESIDENT PEREZ RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE GENERAL PROPOSAL, SAYING SPECIFICALLY THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE LEAD WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO TO RECONVENE THE AYACUCHO COUNTRIES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE OPENING OF THE SSOD FOR THIS MEETING, PERHAPS EVEN PROPOSING THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET WHILE THEY ARE IN NEW YORK. HE TASKED HIS ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER TO PRODUCE A PLAN FOR THIS BY NEXT WEEK, SUGGESTING THAT HE MIGHT SEND THE LETTERS OF INVITATION AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. HE STRESSED THAT US SUPPORT, IN THE FORM OF INTERCEDING WITH OTHER MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO ENCOURAGE THEIR RESTRAINT IN LATIN AMERICA, WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO HIS SUCCESS IN REVIVING AYACUCHO. WE TOLD HIM THAT THIS WOULD BE CONSIS-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CARACA 04012 01 OF 03 291601Z

TENT WITH OUR PLANS FOR ENCOURAGING MULTILATERAL RESTRAINT, AND PROMISED TO MAKE HIS CASE IN WASHINGTON. WE ALSO AGREED TO MEET HIS REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND INFORMATION. ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON MEETING FORWARDED REFTEL.
END SUMMARY.

1. PRESENT AT THE MEETING WERE PRESIDENT PEREZ, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER GOMEX MANTILLA, MYSLEF, LUIGI EINAUDI (ARA), PRISCILLA CLAPP (PM), AND ACTING DCM FRECHETTE. (IN THE ABSENCE OF FOREGIN MINITER CONSALVI, WHO IS HOSPITALIZED IN BOSTON, VICE MINISTER GOMEZ MANTILLA WAS ACTING).

2. I BEGAN THE MEETING REFERRING TO LAST MONTH'S CARTER-PEREZ DISCUSSIONS ON VENEZUELA'S INTEREST IN REVIVING AN ARMS RESTRAINT INITIATIVE IN LATIN AMERICA. CLAPP AND EINAUDI DESCRIBED THE GENERAL US APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT, BOTH UNILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY, AND PRESENTED OUR CONCEPTUAL SCHEME FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL RESTRAIN OVER THE LONG TERM. AS AN AID TO THIS DISCUSSION, PRESIDENT PEREZ WAS GIVEN A WRITEN OUTLINE OF THIS SCHEME IN SPANISH. EINAUDI AND CLAPP EMPHASIZED THAT A REGIME OF RESTRAINT DEVELOPING AT LATIN AMERICAN INITIATIVE WOULD BE AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF GLOBAL ARMS RESTRAINT AND COULD HELP STIMULATE RECIPROCAL RESTRAINT AMONG SUPPLIERS. WE CONCLUDED BY ASKING PRESIDENT PEREZ FOR HIS REACTIONS, HIS IDEAS ON HOW SUCH AN INITIATIVE MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN BY VENEZUELA,AND HIS VIEWS ON HOW THE US MIGHT BE MOST HELPFUL TO HIM.

3. THE FOLLOWING IS NEARLY VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ENSUING EXCHANGE:

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CARACA 04012 01 OF 03 291601Z

PRESIDENT PEREZ:
PRESIDENT CARTER AND I AGREED THAT THE US AND VENEZUELA WOULD STUDY HOW TO PROMOTE ARMS LIMITATION. YOUR VISIT IS A VERY IMPORTANT BEGINNING TO IMPLEMENT WHAT WE AGREED.

WE SAID AT THE TIME THAT PERHPAS IT WOULD BE GOOD TO USE AYACUCHO AS A BEGINNING. BUT FIRST, LET ME MAKE SOME GENERAL REFLECTIONS ON OUR REGIONAL SITUATION HERE IN LATIN AMERICA.

THE BIG BROBLEM IS THE COMPETITION THAT EXISTS AMONG THE ARMS PRODUCERS. I HAVE SIAD THE US HAS FOR SOME TIME NOW BEEN SERIOUSLY TRYING TO PROMOTE ARMS RESTRAINT. BUT THE US'S EFFORTS ARE BEING NULLIFIED BY THE EUROPEANS, WHO SEE IN THIS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO SELL MORE WEAPONS.

THE FACT IS THAT THE EUROPEAN ARMS INDUSTRY MUST DEVE-
LOP AT AN EINCREASING RATE TO SURVIVE.SOME COUNTRIES,
FRANCE FOR EXAMPLE, WANT TO SUBSIDIZE THEIR OWN DEFENSE

EXPENDITURES THRU FOREIGN MILITARY SALES.

THE EUROPEANS OPERATE BY GETTING THEMSELVES AGENTS WHO POSE AS THE FRIENDS OF WHATEVER GOVT HAPPENS TO BE IN POWER. THEY BEGIN BY WORKING ON THE MILITARY, IDENTIFYING KEY LEADERS, INVITING THEM TO COCKTAIL PARTIES AND UNDERTAKING A SERIES OF MANEUVERS TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THEY NEED TO BUY THEIR WEAPONS. SO BEGINS THE ACTION. EACH PURCHASE HAS A RIPPLE EFFECT IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, ENABLING THE FOREIGN ARMS SALESMEN TO DRAW THE MILITARY OF THOSE COUNTRIES INTO THE DANGEROUS GAME OF "BALANCING."

SO TRADE PROMOTION IS THE FIRST PROBLEM THAT SERIOUSLY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 CARACA 04012 01 OF 03 291601Z

COMPLICATES THE ARMS TRANSFER PICTURE. WHEN I WAS IN MOSCOW, THE RUSSIANS POINTED OUT TO ME THAT IN RUSSIA THE ARMS INDUSTRY WAS NOT A COMMERCIAL AFFAIR, BUT THAT THAT WAS NOT THE CASE IN THE WEST, WHERE ARMS WERE GOOD BUSINESS. THEREFORE, THE RUSSIANS SAID, THEY WERE EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPLIER RESTRAINT AMONG THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

THE SECOND PROBLEM IS THAT UNFORTUNATELY ALMOST ALL OUR COUNTRIES HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, PROBLEMS WHICH COULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO WAR. THEREFORE OUR

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CARACA 04012 02 OF 03 291626Z
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 NSCE-00 SP-02 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 ACDA-12 L-03
AF-10 EUR-12 IO-13 /097 W
-----115478 291646Z /45

O 291515Z APR 78

FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2125

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 CARACAS 4012

GENERAL STAFFS ARE ALWAYS PLAYING WAR GAMES. AND WHEN-
EVER THEY PLAY A WAR GAME AND THEIR TEAM LOSES, THEY
RECOMMEND THE PURCHASE OF CERTAIN TYPES OF ARMS TO RE-
DRESS THE BALANCE AND CHANGE THE GAME'S OUTCOME.

TAKE VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA, TWO EMINENTLY PACIFIST
COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NEVER HAD A WAR. EVEN WE STILL
HAVE PROBLEMS, IN OUR CASE THE DEMARCATION OF THE GULF OF
VENEZUELA. AND THE FURTHER SOUTH YOU GO THE WORSE THE
SITUATION IS, FOR THERE PAST WARS HAVE LEFT DEEP HATREDS
THAT REMAIN TO THIS DAY. CHILE, BOLIVIA AND PERU ARE
IN A PERMANENT PRE-WAR STATE. IT SOMETIMES EVEN SEES
THAT WAR IS DESTINED TO BREAK OUT BEFORE 1980, BEFORE
THE END OF THE CENTENNIAL OF THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC. IN
PERU, MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UP TO SWEAR
VENGEANCE FOR THEIR LOSSES IN THAT WAR.

THEN, THERE ARE TENSIONS BETWEEN ECUADOR AND PERU OVER
ACCESS TO THE AMAZON, AND BETWEEN CHILE AND ARGENTINA
OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL. EVEN THE SMALLEST COUNTRIES
HAVE THEIR PROBLEMS, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY HONDURAS AND EL
SALVADOR.

IN ADDITION, THERE IS MEXICO WHICH FOR SO LONG FELT
THAT SINCE IT LIVED NEXT TO THE ELEPHANT IT NEED NOT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CARACA 04012 02 OF 03 291626Z

WORRY ABOUT ITS DEFENSE. NOW, WITH THE BELIZE PROBLEM,
EVEN MEXICO IS LOOKING TO ARM ITSELF.

THE THIRD GENERAL PROBLEM IS THAT OF MILITARY GOVTS.
THE MILITARY IN POWER ARE DANGEROUS. THEY TRY
TO JUSTIFY THEIR PRESENCE IN POWER BY BUYING MORE ARMS,
EXPANDING THEIR MANPOWER, AND EXALTING THE IMPORTANCE AND
ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES.

TWO MORE SPECIFIC FACTORS ARE ALSO DISTURBING.
CUBA HAS BEGUN TO WORRY MANY GENERAL STAFFS. CUBAN
ACTIVISM IN AFRICA EVOKES FEARS THAT SIMILAR ADVENTURISM
COULD TAKE PLACE IN THIS HEMISPHERE. A QUESTION ARISES
IN THIS CONNECTION: MIGHT NOT THE US CONSIDER
IT IN ITS NATIONAL INTEREST TO STIMULATE INCREASED ARMS
PURCHASES IN LATIN AMERICA TO BALANCE A POSSIBLE CUBAN
THREAT? I ASK THAT QUESTION NOT BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT
IS YOUR PLAN, BUT BECAUSE I AM WORRIED THAT IT MAY HAPPEN.

THE OTHER SPECIAL FACTOR IS BRAZIL. BRAZIL IS A MAJOR
COUNTRY WHICH CREATES MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR THE SOUTH
AMERICAN GEO-POLITICAL BALANCE. FOR ARGENTINA, FOR

EXAMPLE, THE OLD RIVALRY FOR PRIMACY WITH BRAZIL IS A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLICATES ACHIEVEMENT OF REGION-WIDE RESTRAINT.

IN SUM, YOU CAN SEE THAT IN LATIN AMERICA WE HAVE A RATHER NEGATIVE ENVIRONMENT THAT MAKES ME PESSIMISTIC ABOUT SOME OF THE IDEAS YOU HAVE PRESENTED ME THIS MORNING.

THE FACT IS, HOWEVER, THAT THE COINCIDENCE EXISTS THAT THE DECLARATION OF AYACUCHO WAS SIGNED BY MANY OF THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CARACA 04012 02 OF 03 291626Z

COUNTRIES WITH THE WORST PROBLEMS. CHILE, BOLIVIA, PERU, ECUADOR, VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA, PLUS ARGENTINA AND PANAMA, ARE ALL SIGNATORIES AND SOME OF THEM HAVE THE WORST PROBLEMS AMONG EACH OTHER. AYACUCHO SHOULD THUS FORM THE NUCLEUS OF OUR EFFORTS.

SO I THINK WE SHOULD FOCUS ON REACTIVATING THIS DECLARATION. IF WE CAN MOVE ON THIS, AND IF THE US SUPPORTS US, THIS MIGHT BE THE BEST PATH.

OF COURSE, FOR THIS TO HAPPEN IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO REACH AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US, CANADA AND EUROPE THAT ARE IN A SENSE THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM. IT IS TRUE THAT YOU IMPOSED SOME LIMITATIONS ON YOUR OWN TRANSFERS. BUT WHAT DID WE DO? WE WENT TO EUROPE. FRANCE HAS MADE A KILLING IN MIRAGE SALES IN ALL OUR COUNTRIES. AND NOW RUSSIA IS IN THE GAME AS WELL. THE US WAS NOT SELLING ARMS TO THE PERUVIANS, SO THE PERUVIANS WENT TO THE RUSSIANS. I PERSONALLY DO NOT BELIEVE THE US WAS REFUSING TO SELL TO PERU BECAUSE PERU HAD A LEFTIST GOVT, BUT BECAUSE THE US UNDERSTOOD THAT PERU'S POLICIES WERE UNBALANCING. BUT THIS GAVE THE SOVIET UNION AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE IN AND CREATE AN EVEN GREATER IMBALANCE.

SO WITHOUT AGREEMENT AMONG PRODUCERS, INCLUDING THE USSR, AGREEMENT WOULD BE DIFFICULT HERE IN LATIN AMERICA. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE SUCH AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE ARMS SUPPLIERS, THEN I THINK AN AGREEMENT IN LATIN AMERICAN WOULD BE POSSIBLE, BECAUSE IT WOULD BE FORCED BY EVENTS.

IN SUM I THINK THIS IS AN EXTRAORDINARY OUTLINE WHICH COVERS MOST OF THE ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM. BUT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BEGIN AT THE END, THAT IS WITH AGREEMENT AMONG SUPPLIERS RATHER THAN AMONG RE-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 CARACA 04012 02 OF 03 291626Z

CIPIENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, FROM THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE,
WE SHOULD BEGYN WITHIN THE AYACUCHO FRAMWORK. IF WE
WERE TO GO BEYOND IT, AND ADD THE ARGENTINE-BRAZIL RIVALRY
TO THE EQUIATION, THE SITUATION WOULD BE MUCH MORE COMPLI-
CATED AND HARDER TO DEAL WITH. AND I THINK WE SHOULD
FOCUS EXLUSIVELY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS: THE NUCLEAR
PROBLEM SHOULD BE KEPT APART.

MS CLAPP:

IF WE CAME TO AGREEMENTS ON LIMITATIONSWITH THE OTHER
SUPPLIERS, WOULDNT IT SEEM THAT WE WERE DICTATING TO
LATIN AMIERCA?

PRESIDENT PEREZ:

SO WHAT? WHAT DOES THAT MATTER? IF THIS IS DONE WITHING
A FRAMEWORK OR A COMPLEX OF CONCEPTS LIKE THOSE WE HAVE
ALL AGREED TO IN PARTICIPATING IN THE UN SYSTEM, BUT WHICH

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CARACA 00003 291636Z
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 IO-13 NSCE-00 SP-02 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 ACDA-12 L-03
AF-10 EUR-12 SSO-00 /097 W
-----115597 291648Z /45

O 291515Z APR 78

FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2126

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 CARACAS 4012

MOST OF US DO NOT FOLLOW, OURPEOPLE WILL HAVE NO
GROUNDS TO OBJECT.

MS CLAPP:

WHAT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING SUPPLIER/RE-
CIPIENT WORKING GROUPS?

PRESIDENT PEREZ:

I THINK WE SHOULD DEAL FIRST WITH THE SUPPLIERS, THEN
WITH THE RECIPIENTS.

MS CLAPP:

ARE YOU SAYING THERE IS NO HOPE FOR REGIONAL RESTRAINT
WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT AMONG SUPPLIERS?

PRESIDENT PEREZ:

NO. JUST THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER IF ALL THE SUPPLIERS
AGREED FROM THE BEGINNING.

AMBASSADOR VAKY:

A DECLARATION BY THE LATIN AMERICAN RECIPIENTS ABOUT THE
NEED FOR RESTRAINT WOULD HELP US IN OUR DEALINGS WITH
THE SUPPLIERS.

PRESIDENT PEREZ:

YOU ARE RIGHT. WE NEED PARALLEL ACTION, ALL I'M SAYING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CARACA 00003 291636Z

IS THAT THIS NOT AN EASY OR SHORT TERM PROBLEM.

MS CLAPP:

DO YOU FEEL IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO US TO TALK TO THE
RUSSIANS SPECIFICALLY ABOUT RESTRAINT IN LATIN AMERICA?

PRESIDENT PEREZ:

ABSOLUTELY. I HAVE ALREADY TOLD THEM THAT THEIR BE-
HAVIOR IS SELLING TO PERU ON CONCESSIONAL TERMS CONTRA-
DICTED THEIR THEORIES. IT WOULD HELP IF YOU WOULD DO
SO AS WELL.

BESIDES, IN TALKING TO THE SOVIETS, YOU MIGHT AS WELL
TALK ABOUT LATINA MERICA. AFTER ALL, COMPLEX AS ARE OUR
PROBLEMS HERE, THEY ARE SMALL COMPARED TO AFRICA AND
OTHER REGIONS. SO YOU SHOULD RAISE THE LATIN AMERICAN
DIMENSION WITH THEM.

MS CLAPP:

DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD TALK ALSO TO THE MAJOR EUROPEAN
SUPPLIERS?

PRESIDENT PEREZ: OF COURSE. YOU SHOULD DO EVERYTHING YOU CAN. THE
FRENCH ARE PARTICULARLY BAD.

MS CLAPP:

THIS COULD BE POSSIBLE WITHIN OUR PLANS FOR ENCOURAGING
MULTILATERAL RESTRAINT AND IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CURRENT
DISCUSSIONS WITH SUPPLIERS.

PRESIDENT PEREZ: I ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SOMETIME AGO
FOR A WORKING PAPER ON HOW TO REVIVE THE AYACUCHO PROCESS
AND PUT IT ON A MORE POLITICAL LEVEL. MOST OF THE PREVIOUS
MEETINGS WERE HELD AT A MILITARY LEVEL. THIS MADE NO SENSE.
ALL THE MILITARY WERE INTERESTED IN CONSULTING ABOUT WAS HOW

TO GET MORE ARMAMENTS.
THE US SHOULD PRESENT US MORE CONCRETE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CARACA 00003 291636Z

PAPERS AS WELL.WE HAVE TOTALLY COMMON INTERSTS AND
VIEWPOI TS ON THIS MATTER. THE MORE HELP YOU CAN GIVE
ME, THE BETTER.

AMBASSADOR VAKY:
WE COULD POSSIBLY PROVIDE MILITARY ADVICE AS WELL. BY
INVOLVING SOME OF OUR MILITARY PEOPLE WE MIGHT BE ABLE
TO COUNTER SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS MADE BY YOUR MILITARY.

PRESIDENT PEREZ:
YOU ARE RIGHT. WE SHOULD PREPARE RAPIDLY. I AM SORRY
THAT THE SSOD IS OPENING SO SOON. I HAD BEEN HOPING TO
HOLD A MEETING OF THE AYACUCHO FOREIGN MINISTERS TO CON-
SIDER THESE PROBLEMS. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN INTERSTING TO
HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HOLD IT BEFORE THE SSOD.

MS CLAPP:
THE SSOD PROCESS WILL LAST THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

PRESIDENT PEREZ:
IN THAT CASE, AND SEEINH THAT THE SSOD DOES NOT OPEN
UNTIL THE 18TH, THERE COULD STLL BE TIME FOR ME TO PRO-
POSE TO THE OTHER AYACUCHO SIGNATORIES THAT WE JOINTLY
CONSIDER A COMMON POSITION TO PROMOTE SOME MOVEMENT. THE
MEETINGS COULD EVEN BE HELD IN NEW YORK, FOR EXAMPLE ON
THE 16TH OR 17TH. BUT WE MUST MOVE FAST.

ASSUMING THAT I CAN GET A PAPER NEXT WEEK, I WILL TRY
TO SEND A PROPOSAL SUGGESTING SUCH AMEETING.

MS CLAPP:
IN THAT CASE, I WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON TOMORROW TO
REPORT ON YOUR PLANS, TO SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO SUPPORT
YOU, AND TO URGE THAT WE APPROACH THE SOVIETS AND OTHER
MAJOR SUPPLIERS ON RESTRAINT IN LATIN AMERICAN AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 CARACA 00003 291636Z

AMBASSADOR VAKY:
I WILL KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT YOUR PLANS
AND THE PLANNING IN MY GOVT.

PRESIDENT PEREZ:

*8,3. ANYTHING YOU CAN GIVE ME BY NEXT WEEK WOULD BE
PARTICULARLY USEFUL
VAKY

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LIMITATION OF HOSTILITIES, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978CARACA04012
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780187-0874
Format: TEL
From: CARACAS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t1978042/aaaaabgs.tel
Line Count: 444
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 8c77bca7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 CARACAS 4013
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2857052
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT PEREZ ABOUT REGIONAL RESTRAINT IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS
TAGS: MARR, VE, XM
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8c77bca7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014